Introduction
The year 1997 was a nightmare for Korea and for many East Asian countries. For three decades before the financial crisis, these countries had experienced very high growth rates and this had transformed them from some of the poorest countries in the world into new industrializing economies (NIEs), or into newly new industrializing economies (NNIEs). Korea, in particular, outperformed other Asian countries and it became the 29th member country of the OECD in December 1996.
1 Less than a year after its admission to the OECD, however, Korea experienced a severe financial crisis. We ought to explain, then, what caused these fast growing countries to experience this unpredicted financial crisis. Since the crisis erupted, a number of people including economists, journalists and politicians have tried to answer the question. However, there is no consensus, and each individual analyst tends to explain the causes of the Asian crisis, subscribing exclusively to one of the explanatory categories. These people can be categorized into four groups. 2 The first group headed by Radelet and Sachs (1998a,b) argues that the Asian crisis erupted because, even though there was no serious problem, self-fulfilling investors suddenly panicked and ran away from East Asia in a herd. The second group headed by Krugman (1998a) and Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998a,b) takes the opposite position and claims that the fundamental problems of these countries had accumulated and finally erupted at once when they reached the maximum level. The third group blames mostly the policy failures made by the crisis countries before the crisis occurred. The fourth group argues that the crisis erupted mainly because of external factors like abrupt changes in international market conditions. Unlike the first and second groups, which include mostly economists, the third and fourth groups seemed to include mostly politicians and journalists.
1 Up until 1996, Korea enjoyed over 8 percent annual growth rate of its real GDP for over thirty years. Accordingly, its GDP soared from US$ 2.1 billion in 1961 to US$ 484.4 billion in 1996, while its per capita GNP rose from US$ 82 to US$ 10,543 over the same period. 2 In fact, there have been a very large number of contributions on the causes of the financial crises in Asia. They are mostly available at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~nroubini/asia/AsiaHomepage.html, thanks to Nouriel Roubini. Research papers on the causes of Korea's 1997 crisis written in English include, among others, Bank of Korea (1998) , Park and Rhee (1998) , Min (1998) , Kwon (1998) , Jwa and Huh (1998) , Smith (1998) , OECD (1998) , Borensztein and Lee (1999), and EAAU (1999) . 3 For instance, the Korean parliamentary hearing in early 1999 on the causes of the financial crisis was mainly focused on the policy mistakes made by the then president and the government officials. Some advocates of the Asian values claim that the Asian financial crisis was the result of hegemonic conflict between the East and the West. varied widely across the East Asian countries. Blaming it solely on an economic system once praised as a successful model for development is also inconsistent.
It seems that there is some truth in each of these explanations. Had at least one of these four factors been different from what they actually were, the financial crisis would not have occurred, or it would not have been as destructive as it actually was. In other words, Korea's financial crisis (and maybe most of the other Asian countries' crises as well) occurred not due to one single reason, but due to elements from all of the four explanatory categories.
Accordingly this paper attempts to piece together the fragmented causes of the crisis. Hill (1998, p.10) suggests that "an explanation has to (1) be coherent yet reasonably eclectic, recognizing that no one single explanation is likely to provide all the answers; (2) distinguish between, and chart the interaction among, precipitating 'triggers' and core 'vulnerability' factors; (3) develop an integrated framework, which allows for significant country differences; (4) emphasize the economic and political inter-connections; and (5) draw on the past 'crises and panics' literature, while recognizing that to a significant extent we are in uncharted territory."
We will do this by drawing an analogy between an economy's financial system and the human circulatory system. In particular, we will use the notion of 'stroke', which occurs when there is a sudden blockage of an artery in the brain by a blood clot, or by other debris carried in the bloodstream. This approach may be considered as a kind of general systems theory. The 'stroke' hypothesis synthesizes most of the appealing explanations and theories of the financial crisis, and shows how the numerous factors were coherently intertwined in causing the financial crisis. The hypothesis also allows us to evaluate systematically the consequences and the performance of the IMF's structural reform program. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the 'stroke' hypothesis and explains systematically and comprehensively the underlying and direct causes of the financial crisis. In section 3, this paper evaluates the response of the IMF to the Korea crisis and its consequences, and discusses the future prospects for the Korean economy. Section 4 concludes.
The 'Stroke' Hypothesis: A Systematic and Comprehensive Approach

Analogy between Stroke and Financial Crisis
The financial system in an economy involves the central bank, commercial banks and many different kinds of financial intermediaries. The main function of the financial system in an economy is to create money and deliver it to the real sector, and provide a channel for linking those who want to save with those who want to invest. Any defect in the real sector does not necessarily and directly cause the financial sector to deteriorate. But if the financial system does not work properly, it directly affects the real sector. If there is too much money, for example, the real sector reacts with inflation. If there is too little money, then recession of the real sector is a natural consequence.
The circulatory system of the human being consists of heart, arteries, veins and capillaries, whose function is to create blood and deliver it to the whole body, and work as a medium of exchange between oxygen and carbon dioxide. Just like the financial system, a defect in the blood vessel system directly causes malfunction of body. High or low blood pressure is not desirable.
Thus the financial system in an economy and the human circulatory system are very analogous in terms of their functions. Financial crisis, which normally starts with the liquidity crunch, is also very similar to the human stroke, which happens with the sudden blockage of an artery in the brain by a blood clot or other debris carried in the bloodstream. Financial crisis is also very similar to stroke in that financial crisis can result in the real sector's paralysis and stroke can limit the body's normal functions such as thinking, movement, speech and the senses.
Therefore, it may be very useful to understand the nature of stroke in understanding the nature of the financial crisis. 4 To most people, a stroke normally seems to strike a healthy person. That is, a stroke erupts all of a sudden in a person who has been living his/her life quite normally. As a matter of fact, however, it does not strike a real healthy person. Figure 1 illustrates how strokes normally occur. As illustrated in the Figure, the chance of having a stroke is dependent upon how the person's physical constitution is, how well the person responds to the warning signs of stroke, and how friendly the surroundings are.
Smoking, heavy alcohol intake, lack of exercise and a high fat diet normally result in the physical weakness of a person, contributing to high blood pressure, high blood cholesterol, diabetes and obesity, which then speed up hardening of the arteries. When a person's physical constitution becomes weak, the risk of having a stroke increases. Therefore, if a person has high blood pressure or other contributing factors, it is very important for him/her to change his/her life style by stopping smoking, limiting the amount of alcohol intake, having regular exercise and eating less fat. If the person fails to react properly to his/her weakening physical constitution, then he/she becomes constitutionally predisposed to stroke. Unfriendly surroundings such as family's apathy to his/her physical weakness, competitive personal relationships and a heavy burden of work also contribute to the likelihood of having a stroke.
Strokes normally occur after giving several different kinds of warning signs beforehand. Sudden loss or blurring of vision in one eye is one important warning sign. And it may be only a passing weakness, dizziness, fainting or tingling in a limb. If there appears a warning sign and the person fails to take appropriate actions, then the stroke risk increases significantly. Finally when there is a sudden sharp stress, worry, heavy exercise or an exposure to the cold weather, which work as a trigger or an exogenous shock, then a stroke may finally occur, with a serious damage to the body.
Korea's financial crisis underwent a very similar process to a typical stroke. To most people, it appears to have erupted all of a sudden when the panicked foreign investors turned their backs on Korea. In retrospect, however, it erupted after several early symptoms. Fundamental weaknesses, policy mistakes, unfriendly international circumstances and exogenous shocks all contributed to the crisis. Of course, one may argue that we still need to single out one or two factors, which are considered most critical to the crisis. Yes, this is a reasonable argument. But it seems that each of the four factors played a critical role and should be considered equally important causes of the financial crisis.
Using the 'stroke' framework, a systematic and comprehensive process of the Korean financial crisis is illustrated in Figure 2 . As seen in the Figure, the four factors played a role and intertwined with each other systematically, resulting in the financial crisis. That is, since the late 1980s the fundamental weaknesses have accumulated, and hence the international competitiveness of Korean corporations has weakened. On the other hand, the international environment, which used to be somewhat friendly with Korea's export-oriented growth strategy, has rapidly become hostile. This also put the downward pressure on Korea's competitiveness, and made the Korean economy even more vulnerable to the sudden changes in the world economy. However, the Korean government has overlooked the signs of weakening competitiveness and possibility of financial crisis and, instead, aggravated the situation by making consecutive policy mistakes. Finally, a sudden exogenous shock in early 1997 triggered the financial crisis to erupt.
The following subsections attempt to explain the factors and process of the financial crisis in more detail. Fundamental weaknesses, unfriendly environment, policy mistakes and triggering factors are considered in order.
Fundamental Weaknesses
Just like a typical stroke, the financial crisis of Korea had its roots in fundamental weaknesses. The fundamental weaknesses, and hence the weakening of the international competitiveness of Korea have developed since the late 1980s.
From the early 1960s, Korea enjoyed extraordinary growth that transformed it from one of the poorest countries in the world to the 29th member of the OECD. In 1996, Korea was the world's 11th largest economy in terms of GDP. With regard to the fundamental basis for economic growth, the following two factors contributed to Korea's rapid growth.
5 First, Korean people were diligent as proven by their long working hours and high savings rates. Also they were well educated due to the strong Confucian emphasis on education. The second most important cause of the rapid growth was the government's strong leadership in creating and developing strategic manufacturing industries and in moving towards export-oriented growth. This is a somewhat controversial argument, as there is plenty of evidence that Korea's industrial policies did not contribute to the growth of industries' productivity. But at least until the early 1980s, a strong government leadership was somewhat necessary and desirable, because the size of the domestic markets was small, the structure of the domestic industry was rather simple, and Korea's exposure to the world market was limited.
Since the late 1980s onwards, however, these two factors have become no longer valid. We discuss the reasons below.
Sterilizing Economic Soil
With the advent of democratization in 1987 and the subsequent liberalization of trade unions, nominal wage increased 15 percent per annum up until 1996, exceeding productivity that rose by 11 percent. However, tight labor market conditions and strong trade union power ensured that labor market reform went untouched. The labor market was full of rigidities. An excessive degree of job protection prevented lay-offs and encouraged overmanning, inflexible working hours and few limits on strike action. (Fitch ICBA, 1999) What was more critical than the rapid rise in the wage rate and labor market rigidities was that the Korean education system no longer provided the economy with a labor force it needed most. Since the late 1980s, as the Korean economy has moved toward the level of developed countries, its products have become more sophisticated and its production processes have become more complex and more deeply integrated into the world economy. This all means that Korea has rapidly become in urgent need of a creative and highly skilled labor force -entrepreneurs, workers, bankers and the like. However, the Korean education system has kept its repetitive-memory-oriented education, which once proved to be successful when the Korean economy was in a less developed stage. 6 On the other hand, Koreans have continued to work longer hours than their competitors, and their savings rates have remained very high.
7 However, the rapid rise in the wage rate, labor market rigidities and the lack of a creative labor force have made the Korean economic soil sterile, and these indigenous factors have weakened the international competitiveness of Korean firms.
Inefficient Government-driven Capitalism
As noted above, the government-led economic policy was once considered to have led the nation its remarkable economic success in the 1960s-1980s. But it was no longer suited in the 1990s as the Korean economy became larger and more complex, and as the global competition became keen. Excess government involvement in the economy caused inefficiency, over-capacity and imbalances in many sectors.
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The political sector had its ties with some businesses, intervening in the process of extending loans to huge family-controlled conglomerates or chaebols and in deciding major state-funded projects for political kickbacks in return. Accordingly, capital, production and exports were heavily skewed towards chaebols, with myriad cross-guarantees on borrowing and limited transparency and accountability. And a "too big to fail" mentality of chaebols resulted in their excessive risk-taking, over-investment and insufficient attention to credit and exchange rate risks. Over-indebtedness, overcapacity and poor earning power among chaebols were a natural outcome. By the end of 1997, the top 30 chaebols had debt-equity ratios of 519 percent, a sharp contrast with 154 percent in the United States and 193 percent in Japan.
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On the other hand, the excessive government control of the banking system made banking institutions rely more on government intervention than on profit-first business. This, in turn, resulted in the misguided advancing of bank loans to nonviable or insolvent borrowers.
Thus, the active government's involvement in the market resulted not only in corruption, but also in moral hazard and inefficiency in the general economic sector, and a weakening of the competitiveness of enterprises and banks. These altogether, of course, left Korea vulnerable to shocks in an increasingly globalizing financial market.
Unfriendly Environment
Korea's fast growth was in part due to the international circumstances, which were favorable to Korea until the late 1980s. First of all, the world's free trade movement under the GATT enabled Korea to effectively pursue an export-oriented growth strategy. Following a number of the multilateral trade talks, the developed countries moved toward the opening of their domestic markets, yet Korea, a less developed country, was allowed to keep its domestic market closed effectively until the end of 1980s. Secondly, Korea, which became a part of western capitalism after its independence in 1945, received a considerable amount of explicit and implicit economic assistance from the United States during the cold war era. The United States also provided the largest market for Korea's export.
Since the late 1980s, however, Korean companies have faced intense competition with foreign companies in both domestic and international markets. Competition has mainly come from the rapid opening of Korea's domestic market, the rapid catch-up growth of the NNIEs and the commercial conflicts with the United States.
Rapid Opening of the Domestic Market
In 1989, Korea announced that it would no longer restrict trade for the sake of its balance of payments (as covered in GATT Article XVIIIB) and it would follow article XI, further increasing its pace of import liberalization. With the conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the embarkation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), Korea faced a more rapid opening of its domestic market. Furthermore, former President Kim Young-Sam who came to power in 1993 proclaimed that Korea would join the OECD during his term of office. OECD access required that Korea open even wider and faster its domestic market. As a result, by 1996, the number of restrictions and the average tariff rates for manufacturing goods were comparable to those of most industrial countries.
Compared to the goods market, the financial market, in the name of financial liberalization, underwent an even faster opening. During the early 1990s, restrictions on the inflow and outflow of mobile capital were nearly removed.
10 However, the liberalization happened with little attention to the new kinds of regulation that would be required and with only a thin base of financial skills. The liberalized financial systems enabled inexperienced private domestic banks and firms to take out large, dollardenominated loans from foreign lenders.
Thus, the rapid opening and liberalization of the financial market in the early 1990s left the economy exposed and vulnerable to the instabilities of the international financial markets.
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A Nut in a Nutcracker
Since the early 1980s, China has strongly pursued a so-called 'reform and open-door policy.' This new policy was very successful, and between 1980 and 1996 China's real GDP grew by more than 10 percent per annum. The rise of China, however, meant intense new competition for Korean firms. China's manufactured exports grew by more than 20 percent per annum in the US dollar terms between 1990 and 1996, and Chinese firms competed directly with Korean firms in textiles, apparel, and electronics. In addition, the rapid catch-up growth of the NNIEs of Southeast Asia, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines also led to harsher competition for Korea.
Obviously this new competition put downward pressure on Korea's international competitiveness and hence its exports. Accordingly, to maintain the wage rates higher than the NNIEs, Korea had to change its industrial structure to become more high-tech-oriented. In fact, following the textbook example of Japan, Korea invested a huge amount of capital into the so-called strategic industries such as electronics, automobiles, biochemicals, etc. As a consequence, however, Korean companies found themselves competing directly against Japanese companies in some important industries.
Thus, Korea faced a very difficult economic predicament. It had to compete against China and other NNIEs on the one hand, and against Japan on the other. That is, Korea was being squeezed both from above and from below. In short, Korea was situated like 'a nut in a nutcracker,' as stated first in the Boose Allen & Hamilton report on the Korean economy, which was published just before the financial crisis.
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Korea, a nut in a nutcracker, faced even more pressure when in January 1994, China devalued the yuan by 50 percent, and as the Japanese yen progressively depreciated against the U.S. dollar: from Y/$ 85 in June 1995 to Y/$ 127 in April 1997. Semiconductor prices also collapsed by as much as 80 percent in 1996. This delivered a severe terms-of-trade shock to Korea, for this industry accounted for 20 percent of Korea's total exports by value.
Commercial Conflicts with the United States
Since the late 1980s, Korea and the United States have had repetitive trade conflicts in various areas. Of course, Korea's relatively heavy protectionism and state intervention in the market were the main reason. But these had not recently come into existence. A more compelling reason could be found in America's new protectionism as evidenced with its Super 301. Another reason is that Korea's strategic importance in the forefront of the free world has lessened dramatically since the 1980s, as the former Soviet Union fell apart and its former satellite states have initiated the economic reforms of a free market. Even though the United States still stationed its troops in Korea, it became less tolerant with Korea's industrial policy. Accordingly, between 1990 and 1996, out of the total trade conflicts Korea had with all other countries, 36 percent was recorded with the United States.
As a result, since 1991 Korea has had continuous deficits in trade with the United States, except for 1993 which had US$ 0.2 billion surplus. This was quite a remarkable sign of the weakening of the Korea's competitiveness, because the United States was Korea's largest export market and was the country with which Korea had used to enjoy the largest trade surplus.
Policy Mistakes
Just like a typical stroke, there were signs of the weakening of economic fundamentals and warning symptoms of impending crisis. For instance, export growth relative to import growth, measured in the US dollars, began to slow in the mid-1990s. For example, exports in the US dollar terms increased by just 12.8 percent per annum between 1990 and 1996, while imports increased by 14.1 percent per annum during the same period. [ Figure 3 ] Accordingly, the current account, which had showed surplus since the mid-1980s, has recorded deficits annually since 1990, except for 1993, which had a minor surplus. Most markedly the current account deficit widened sharply to US$ 23 billion in 1996 from US$ 8.5 billion in 1995. The ratio of the current account deficit to GDP rose to 4.7 percent in 1996 from 1.7 percent in 1995. From 1990 to 1996, the cumulative current account deficit amounted to US$ 48.7 billion, and the current account deficit was financed mainly by inflow of foreign capital. [ Figure 4 ] This, in turn, caused a sharp increase in foreign debts. The net external debts increased from US$ 3.0 billion in 1989 to US$ 52.9 billion in 1996. The entire external debts increased from US$ 29.3 billion in 1989 to US$ 157.5 billion in 1996.
The Korea Stock Price Index (KOSPI), which once reached over 1100 points in 1994, has dropped to 600-point level in early 1997. [ Figure 5 ] But the Korean government underestimated the early signs and denied the possibility of a financial crisis, repeatedly citing its strong GDP growth rates, high savings rates, budget surplus and moderate inflation rates. Accordingly, even when warnings of the likelihood of a crisis were circulating among foreign investors, it did not react to the signs properly and decisively to prevent the actual crisis.
Among the policy mistakes made by the Korean government before the crisis, three major ones are discussed in the following. The prime mistake was in its exchange rate policy. Inappropriate financial market supervision also turned out to be a serious mistake. The Korean government also failed to take appropriate action in response to the repeated defaults of chaebols and the speculative attacks in the early 1997.
Strong Won Policy
As explained above, since the late 1980s the international competitiveness of Korean industry has continued to falter as the economic fundamentals and international circumstances have deteriorated. Then the Korean won should have depreciated; otherwise the current account deficits would have followed.
However, the Korean government adopted a strong won policy. The strong won policy was maintained with the so-called market average foreign exchange rate system, which was adopted in 1990. The exchange rate was allowed to move within the daily fluctuation band, which was kept narrow. 13 [ Figure 6 ] Radelet and Sachs (1998b) estimate that the Korea won appreciated in real terms about 12 percent between 1990 and 1997. 14 13 Even though the daily fluctuation band had been widened gradually with the progress of financial liberalization, it remained at only ±2.25 percent just before the crisis. 14 In fact, there have been some arguments that the Korean won was not overvalued before the crisis. For instance, Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998a,b) , and Chinn (1998) among others claim that in Korea, the real exchange rate was roughly in equilibrium on the eve of the crisis. This may reflect the problems with regard to the methods in calculating the real exchange rate. Nonetheless, the fact that until 1997 Korea experienced the consecutive current account deficits and after the onset of the crisis won depreciated by a large amount, seems to prove that the Korean won was obviously overvalued.
Why did the Korean government insist on a strong won policy? The following are some possible answers. First, to achieve the target of one-digit inflation rate per annum, the Korean government insisted on the nominal exchange rate stability. That is, inflation control was the overriding priority of macroeconomic policy and the exchange rate was an 'anchor' for inflation control.
15 Second, the Korean government maintained the position that strong won would push Korean firms to strive to increase their productivity and hence international competitiveness. Third, the government wanted to keep the exchange rate stable in order to help domestic corporations and financial institutions by lowering the domestic currency costs of servicing foreign debts denominated in the US dollars. Fourth, a political consideration also made the exchange rate policy less flexible. The then Kim Young-Sam government strongly wished to realize US$10,000 income per capita. Once the per capita income reached US$10,000 in 1995, the government did not want it to slide with the depreciation of the domestic currency.
Inappropriate Supervision of Financial Sector
As noted above, during the early 1990s, the financial market underwent a very rapid liberalization and deregulation. This allowed domestic financial institutions to have easy access to foreign capital to finance domestic investment. The problem was that financial liberalization was done without adequate process and provision of the safety net.
First, financial liberalization was carried out mostly on short-term rather than long-term capital inflows. For instance, the net foreign portfolio investment, which was merely US$ 0.1 billion in 1990, increased drastically to US$ 3.1 billion in 1991, US$ 5.8 billion in 1992, US$ 10.0 billion in 1993. This upward trend continued until 1996. However, the net direct investment continuously revealed negative values, indicating that the foreigners' direct investment in Korea was smaller than Korea's direct investment overseas. [ Figure 7 ] Secondly, appropriate supervision and prudential regulation did not accompany financial liberalization. Especially, the secondary financial institutions such as merchant banks, which increased sharply from six until 1993 to thirty by 1996, were not under appropriate supervision. With the belief that the government would not allow financial institutions to fail, Korean banks borrowed unhedged short-run foreign capital at lower rates, denominated in the US dollar, and made long-term loans at higher rates, with expectation that they could continually renew short-term borrowing. This led to a serious mismatch in maturities between borrowing and lending. Short-term loans accounted for 63 percent of the total debts on the eve of the financial crisis. With this fragile structure of foreign debt, Korea became very vulnerable to the instabilities of the international financial markets.
Naive Policy Response to the Early Warning Signs 15 In fact, the nominal W/US$ exchange rate seems to have affected the price level considerably in Korea. Lee and Cheong (1997) , for example, show that the exchange rate has been a good predictor of the future movements in prices.
A series of policy mistakes were also made in response to the early symptoms or warning signs of the impending crisis, which started to appear early in 1997. First, the Korean government did not properly and swiftly cope with the corporate insolvencies, which had a devastating impact on Korea's financial system. The government repeatedly declared that troubled firms would be dealt with on the basis of the market mechanism. However, amid the critical situation in the first half of 1997, the government aggravated the financial turmoil by taking measures counter to market principles such as the Bankruptcy Prevention Accord and state subsidies for the hopelessly ailing chaebols. Especially, the Korean government's decision to convert Kia Motors, the insolvent eighth largest chaebol, into a public enterprise heightened the confusion and distrust among the foreign investors.
The second mistake made by the government was with the exchange rate policy. With the Thai currency collapse in July 1997, contagion spread to Indonesia, Malaysia, and even to Singapore and Hong Kong. When speculative attacks on the Korean won began in October and accelerated in November, the Korean government maintained a narrow daily fluctuation band and tried to defend the Korean won inexplicably, wasting valuable foreign exchange reserves. As a consequence, Korea's available foreign exchange reserves fell far below the outstanding short-term foreign debts. In retrospect, if the band had been widened earlier and the exchange rate had been allowed to float freely, the Korean won would have depreciated gradually and this would have helped limit the extent of the crisis. 16 Third, the Korean government waited until the country's usable foreign currency reserves plummeted to US$ 7.3 billion, and the country was on the verge of a debt moratorium, before turning to the IMF on November 21. As Korean banks faced difficulties in rolling over their short-term foreign liabilities, the Bank of Korea shifted foreign exchange reserves to the banks' offshore branches and announced a guarantee of foreign borrowing by Korean banks. However, this action merely helped many foreign creditors to escape from Korea, and Korea soon found itself on the brink of national insolvency as the country's usable reserves became almost depleted.
Thus, once the financial crisis began to spread from Thailand, the Korean government made a number of mistakes, and these mistakes accelerated the capital withdrawals and caused a serous crisis of its own.
Why then did the Korean government, once considered shrewd and efficient, make such policy mistakes? Most of all, the then Korean government was in total disarray in its decision-making during the 'lame duck' period of Kim Young-Sam's presidency. The presidential election was scheduled to take place in December 1997. For instance, when the crisis was escalating, there was an internal struggle between the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MoFE) and the central bank over their roles in the financial market.
Exogenous Shocks: The Trigger
Normally, a stroke finally occurs when there is a trigger. A great deal of stress or sudden cold weather to which the patient is exposed could be a trigger. The Korean financial crisis also erupted eventually with the exogenous shocks, which acted as a trigger. There were two different shocks in early 1997: one came as a stress from inside, and the other came as cold weather from outside. That is, the drastic increase in corporate insolvencies acted as a stress on the Korean economy and the financial crises of Southeast Asian countries acted as sudden cold weather to which the Korean economy was exposed.
As briefly noted above, along with economic cycle of downturn, a series of large corporate bankruptcies began with Hanbo Steel, the fourteenth largest chaebol in Korea, in January 1997. In fact, before Korea turned to the IMF for assistance in November, seven out of the top thirty chaebols including Kia Motors, the eighth largest, faced insolvencies. This resulted in a surge in non-performing loans of commercial banks. At the end of September 1997, non-performing loans of all financial institutions recorded W 32 trillion (7 percent of GDP), about double their level at the end of 1996.
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On the other hand, the financial crisis in Southeast Asia acted in two ways as another trigger of the Korean crisis. First, a drastic devaluation of the currencies of the crisis countries impeded Korea's already-shredded international competitiveness, and this acted as a great downward pressure on the Korean currency. Second, trouble in Southeast Asia acted as a wake-up call for foreign investors to re-evaluate the risk of Korea, and to find out that Korea was already experiencing difficulties in the financial market with the surge in non-performing loans. When Hang Seng Index of the Hong Kong stock market recorded a big downturn on October 23, 1997, the foreign investors suddenly started together in a panic to withdraw their investment and to cut back their short-term loans to Korea. The won depreciated by about 20 percent against the US dollar through November 30 and the stock market index fell by about 30 percent to a ten-year low. Usable foreign currency reserves declined sharply as the Bank of Korea financed the repayment of short-term debt of Korean commercial banks' offshore branches.
Finally, Korea turned to the IMF on November 21, 1997, as the rollover ratio of short-term external borrowings by domestic financial institutions kept decreasing and the country's usable foreign currency reserves plummeted to US$ 7.3 billion, down sharply from US$ 22.3 billion only a month ago.
Thus like a human stroke, the Korean crisis was triggered by the two different shocks: a surge in large corporate bankruptcies inside Korea and the Southeast Asian crisis outside Korea. It should be noted here that the self-reinforcing herding of capital outflows was not a 'cause,' but a 'symptom' of the financial crisis, erupting as a combination of the fundamental weaknesses, the unfriendly international surroundings, the policy mistakes, and the exogenous shocks.
Consequences of the Crisis and the IMF Program
Korea requested assistance from the IMF at a very late stage of the crisis, which of course meant greater complications. What caused things worse was the inappropriate treatment of the crisis by the IMF in the first few months, causing the Korean economy to go into the full-fledged recession. The following explains more.
3.1.The Policy Response and Consequences
The IMF program On December 3, 1997, Korea and the IMF signed an agreement for a financial aid package totaling US$ 58.3 billion subject to broad range of conditions including macroeconomic stabilization and structural reform. The IMF committed emergency funds amounting to US$ 21 billion. Additional US$ 14 billion was committed by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. As a second line of defense, additional US$ 23.3 billion was pledged by the United States, Japan, Australia and other interested countries.
When the IMF program was announced, the IMF expected that the announcement of a large financing package and a reform plan would be enough to turn around the market sentiment. Accordingly, upon the announcement of the program, only US$ 5.5 billion was disbursed, and any discussion on debt rescheduling with international creditors was not attempted.
In line with the IMF Stand-By Arrangement, the Korean government was required to implement tough measures including tight monetary policy, fiscal austerity and the immediate closures of insolvent financial institutions. 18 As an emergency measure, the Korean government was asked to raise interest rates sharply. This measure was expected to stem the outflow of the foreign funds and the rapid depreciation of the exchange rate. The call rate was raised from 12.3 percent on December 1, 1997 to 20.7 percent on December 3, and further to 30.1 percent on December 23. As a consequence, 18 To be more accurate, "the program was built around: (i) a strong macroeconomic framework designed to continue the orderly adjustment in the external current account and contain inflationary pressures, involving a tighter monetary stance and substantial financial adjustment; (ii) a comprehensive strategy to restructure and recapitalize the financial sector, and make it more transparent, market-oriented, better supervised and free from political interference in business decisions; (iii) measures to improve corporate governance; (iv) accelerated liberalization of capital account transactions; (v) further trade liberalization; and (vi) improve the transparency and timely reporting of economic data." <Korea -Memorandum on the Economic Program attached in a Letter of Intent, December 3, 1997, p.1.> yields on three-year corporate bond soared from around 14 percent before the crisis to above 30 percent, and yields on 91-day commercial paper rose sharply from 13-14 percent to peak at 40.8 percent on December 31. [ Figure 8 ] Broad money growth (M3) was reduced to 13.9 percent at the end of December 1997 from 16.3 percent at the end of November 1997. The IMF also asked Korea to take fiscal contractionary adjustments equal to 1.5 percent in 1998.
Troubled financial institutions would be closed or if they were deemed viable, to be restructured and/or recapitalized. Nine insolvent merchant banks, which had been suspended on December 2, were required to submit a rehabilitation plan within 30 days. If these plans were not approved, the institution's license would be revoked. The remaining merchant banks were required to present a program of recapitalization by December 31, 1997. They were required to meet at least a 4 percent capital adequacy ratio of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) by March 31, 1998. Other commercial banks were also required to prepare a plan to meet the BIS 8 percent minimum requirement by September 1998. In addition, virtually all capital account restrictions on foreign investors' access to the bond markets were to be lifted as of January 1, 1998. However, the rollover ratio of short-term debt went further down sharply and usable official reserves were almost depleted in mid-December. For example, the rollover ratio of the seven largest commercial banks fell to 32.2 percent in December from 58.8 percent in November and 86.5 percent in October. After a brief increase to 435 on December 6 from 379 on December 3, the Korea Stock Price Index (KOSPI) kept sliding to reach 351 on December 24. [ Figure 9 ] As the speed of depreciation accelerated, the exchange rate plummeted from about W/US$ 1,150 at the beginning of the month to almost W/US$ 2,000 at the end of the year. 19 [ Figure 10 ] All of these were in fact much worse than the IMF had predicted.
When Korea faced imminent default by December 24, the IMF, backed by the U.S., decided to press the foreign commercial banks to roll over their short-term credits on an enforced basis. The IMF insisted on the comprehensive debt rollover as a condition for further disbursements of the IMF lending package. Initially, the banks and the Korean government announced a freeze on debt servicing. On January 16, the Korean government and the banks formally agreed to a complete rollover of all shortterm debts falling due in the first quarter of 1998. On January 28, an agreement was reached to convert US$ 24 billion in short-term debt into claims of maturities between 1 and 3 years. (Radelet and Sachs, 1998b, p.30) The new arrangements put a brake on the fall of the won, and on the decline in stock market in Korea.
Consequences
As the market interest rates soared to the 30 to 40 percent level, the financial difficulties of corporations became deeper. And as the IMF program required financial institutions to meet the BIS capital adequacy ratios, they became reluctant to provide corporations with funds for fear of incurring new non-performing loans. Even strong banks came under intense pressure as foreign creditors refused to roll over loans and domestic depositors fled to foreign owned banks. The merchant banks, in particular, which used to provide corporations with short-term funds, virtually suspended new lendings to corporations and tended to refuse rolling over loans falling due. This, in turn, made the situation even worse for the debt-ridden corporations, resulting in a boost of the number of insolvencies (especially of small and mediumsized companies) to three times the pre-crisis level. Bankruptcies in Korea hit 3,197 in December 1997, and the figure rose to 3,323 in January 1998, before falling back to 2,749 in March 1998. The ratio of dishonored bills rose drastically to 2.1 percent in December 1997 from 0.5 percent in November 1997. [ Figure 11] On the other hand, the contractionary prescriptions led to a dramatic reduction in consumption, resulting in a 29 percent fall in domestic demand in the first quarter of 1998. During the first quarter of 1998, real GDP recorded a negative growth rate of -3.6 percent for the first time in eighteen years, followed by -7.2 percent, -7.1 percent and -5.4 percent in the second, third and fourth quarters. In 1998, real GDP dropped 5.8 percent on a year-on-year basis. Almost 1.66 million jobs had been lost in 1998, boosting the unemployment rate from 2.2 to 7.9 percent in December 1998, despite a sharp decline in participation rates. The yearly unemployment rate for 1998 was 6.8 percent, also a stark comparison to the 2.6 percent of 1997. Per capita GNP is estimated to have remained at about US$ 6,300 in 1998, down sharply from US$ 9,511 in 1997 and US$ 10,542 in 1996, and fell short of $ 6,745 recorded in 1991. 20 Nominal wage dropped 2.5 percent in 1998 from 1997.
Meanwhile, the current account, which used to record a deficit every month until October 1997, has recorded a surplus since November 1997. In 1998, the current account recorded a surplus of US$ 40 billion, which was the largest in history. [ Figure  12 ] However, this was brought about mainly by the decline in imports rather than an increase in exports. Despite the potential for increased profitability from the exchange rate depreciation, exporters were also badly affected because exporters with confirmed orders were unable to obtain trade credits. In 1998, Korean exports declined 2.8 percent on a year-on-year basis to US$ 132.3 billion, while imports plunged 35.5 percent to US$ 93.3 billion. [ Figure 13] 
Evaluation
Recovery from a stroke depends on how big an area of the brain is affected, and how promptly and well it is treated. If treatment for stroke starts within hours, the clot causing the damage may be dissolved with fewer complications and less disability. Someone who has just had a stroke is also at very high risk of having another, possibly more serious, stroke over the next few days. Therefore an early and appropriate treatment is imperative to help prevent having another stroke and resulting in serious complications. In the medium-and long-term, treatment for the fundamental causes of strokes such as high blood pressure and diabetes should follow.
Similarly, recovery from a financial crisis depends on how extensive the capital outflow and exchange rate depreciation are, and how promptly this trend can be reversed. The first and most immediate way to treat the financial crisis should be to (1) break the self-reinforcing capital outflows and to stabilize the domestic currency (i.e., minimize the likelihood of recurrence) and (2) prevent a collapse of the real sector (i.e., prevent complications). In the medium-and long-term, structural reforms are needed to address the root causes of the crisis.
In line with the analogy of financial crises with strokes, the following evaluates the IMF's response to the Korean crisis.
Was the program's diagnosis and prognosis correct?
A good treatment is based on a thorough examination of the symptoms and a precise prognosis. As the IMF later admitted, however, the initial targets proved wrong as the key economic variables such as real growth rate and unemployment rate turned out to be worse than initially predicted. As shown in Table 1 , the depth of the slowdown was not foreseen in the initial program projections, and major macroeconomic projections were revised sharply and successively downward during the course of the program.
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That there were sharp revisions to projections for growth and exchange rates means that the program was built on an unreliable (to put it more precisely, 'wrong') diagnosis and prognosis. This implies that the IMF program (especially the original one) might have been an inadequate treatment for the Korean financial crisis. As the projections failed to be realized, confidence in the program may have been undermined.
In fact, as will be discussed below, the wrong projections (prognosis) led to inappropriate measures (treatment), and these obviously contributed to the recession (complication). As Jack Boorman, Director of the IMF's Policy Development and Review Department, admits, "the original IMF program was based on the view that the Korean economy would experience a slowdown in growth, but not a deep recession."
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So measures such as tight monetary and fiscal policy along with high interest rates were adopted. These contributed to the recession, and were reversed when the recession turned out to be deeper than expected.
23 But when the tightening was reversed and an expansionary policy was adopted, it was too late as the IMF program measures put a 21 The IMF also made similar mistakes in forecasting the consequences of financial crisis and their program of other crisis countries. For example, the major projections for Thailand and Indonesia were revised four times, respectively in the first year of the program. 22 Boorman, Jack, "For the IMF and Others, Lessons from the Asian Crisis," International Herald Tribune, January 20, 1999. 23 At their meetings in January 1998, the Korean government and the IMF agreed to allow for an increased fiscal deficit. In February 1998, the two sides also agreed to allow for lower interest rates, and the downward rate adjustment was implemented over the following months.
heavy strain on the already-troubled real economy, and caused the economic contraction to be a full-fledged one. Why did the IMF's major macroeconomic projections turn out to be wrong? Hubert Neiss, Director of the IMF's Asia and Pacific Department, argues that this was because "important decisions in several complex and painful areas had to be made almost overnight and without full information." 24 This argument may hold for the original projections of the program. But how was it possible for the projections to be changed significantly five times in less than a year? The IMF claims that this reflects the flexibility of the program. But this raises a question about the credibility of the IMF as a doctor.
Did the program help stabilize the financial market?
In short, some measures of the initial rescue program failed to meet the objective of restoring market confidence, and actually intensified the panic psychology of the international investors. In the first few weeks after the IMF arrangement was announced, the exchange rate depreciated even further. Since early January 1998, the exchange rate has finally begun to stabilize. [ Figure 10 ] There were many reasons for this. First, based on a naive projection of the economy, the IMF did not attempt to press the foreign commercial banks to roll over their short-term credits on an enforced basis. Only when the situation became even worse, the IMF insisted on a comprehensive debt rollover as a condition for further disbursements of the IMF lending package. In retrospect, some debt relief in the shape of loan rollovers and restructuring were necessary to allow more time for repayment.
Second, despite the pledge of US$ 58.3 billion in emergency funds to Korea, only a limited amount of funds was disbursed. Upon announcement of the Stand-By Arrangement, only US$ 5.5 billion was disbursed; by the end of 1997, only US$ 13.2 billion was actually disbursed. This amount was reached only after the emergency acceleration of disbursements on December 24. Of the total emergency funds, US$ 22 billion were contingency funds as the 'second lines of defense' from individual countries, and the precise terms and conditions under which the second lines of defense would be disbursed were never clearly specified. The IMF economists, Lane, et al (1999) , admit that the uncertainties about the availability of the second lines of defense may have influenced market participants in their decision to continue their exit.
Third, recommendations on tight budgets, bank closures and high interest rates contributed to even higher number of business insolvencies, and this in turn worsened the investors' perceptions of Korea's external creditworthiness. This point deserves more detailed discussions as the IMF points to the ultimate steady appreciation of the won as proof of the correctness of their prescriptions.
When domestic and foreign currency bonds are perfect substitutes, the foreign exchange market is in equilibrium only if the interest parity condition holds:
where R W is the interest rate on domestic currency (W) deposits, R $ is the interest rate on foreign currency ($) deposits, E e W/$ is the expected future W/$ exchange rate, and E W/$ is the current W/$ exchange rate. For a given dollar interest rate R $ , if the won interest rate increases, then the Korean won will appreciate against the US dollar as investors all try to shift their funds into won. Yes, this was what the IMF program of high interest rate policy expected to see.
However when domestic and foreign currency bonds are imperfect substitutes, the condition does not hold any longer. Instead, the equilibrium condition above needs to incorporate a risk premium. Thus equation (1) becomes (2) (2) R W = R $ + (E e W/$ -E W/$ )/E W/$ + π where π is a risk premium that reflects the difference between the riskiness of domestic and foreign bonds. If the IMF was right, a sharp increase in interest rates should have stabilized the exchange rate. As seen in Figure 10 , however, the exchange rate quickly depreciated far below the targets set in the program. But the tight money supply and high interest rates triggered more corporate failures, and this was, of course, far from improving public confidence. [ Figure 11 ] The resulting financial instability and unrest might have caused risk premium, π, to rise sharply, resulting net capital outflow instead of the inflow. This may have resulted in the free-falls of the Korean currency.
Furthermore there is very little evidence that the hikes in interest rates brought about capital inflow. For instance, during the first quarter of 1998, the net foreign portfolio investment was merely US$ 7.5 billion, which is too little to stabilize the exchange rate. [ Figure 14 ] As a matter of fact, the Korean won appreciated during the same period because of the international financial assistance of US$ 21.4 billion, a success in rolling over most short-term external debt of banking sector totaling US$ 21.8 billion in March 1998, and a record trade surplus of US$ 12.3 billion.
As Radelet and Sachs (1998b) point out, the first signs of the end of the currency free-falls only came on December 24, when the IMF changed its strategy. The IMF initiated a different approach to the problem based on debt restructuring, accelerated disbursements of international funding, and more comprehensive and rational financial sector restructuring.
Did the program help prevent complication?
As noted above, the IMF measures were made based on seriously inaccurate projections of the Korean economy. Accordingly, the original program included measures such as immediate closures of some financial institutions, tight budgets and high interest rates.
These measures were designed mainly to stabilize the financial market. But, as noted above, it is doubtful if they were successful in stabilizing the financial market by increasing perceptions of risk in the Korean economy. Instead, these measures needlessly aggravated the distress of the real sector and intensified the crisis, as the much higher interest rates and cuts in domestic demand caused many profitable but high debt-equity firms into bankruptcy. Thus the external liquidity crisis became the fullfledged economic crisis as the full extent of the collateral damage to the real sector became apparent. Even in the United States or in any other advanced countries, many firms would experience severe financial difficulties if the market interest rates were over 30 percent.
Of course, the opposite approach would have not been desirable either. Pursuing an expansionary monetary policy and lowering interest rates would have caused the exchange rate to over-depreciate, have lead to the hyperinflation and have damaged companies with unhedged obligations needing to repay large foreign debt. The point here is that that the initial program should have avoided excessive tightening, and should have concentrated on the rescheduling of the foreign debt. In addition, instead of using most of the emergency IMF loans to meet the debt servicing obligations coming due, a portion of the IMF loans should have been used to help finance credits for manufactures and exporters who were facing a sharp credit squeeze because of the financial crisis.
In sum, the IMF's serious inability of making credible projections resulted in wrong prescriptions and treatment, which in turn deepened the woes of the already-troubled Korean economy.
Did the program address the fundamental causes properly?
As fully discussed in section 3, the Korean crisis had its roots in the weakened fundamentals of the Korean economy. Therefore, attempting to stabilize only the financial market without an emphasis on structural reforms is like treating symptoms without addressing causes.
As a matter of fact, the IMF program had a heavy emphasis on structural reforms of the Korean economy. Since the beginning of the IMF program, Korea has undertaken structural reforms in banking sector, capital market, corporate sector, labour market, and public sector, which are considered to be essential for the revival of sustained growth. Nonetheless, two points are made with regard to the timing of the fundamental measures of the IMF program.
First, when the IMF program was first implemented in December 1997, it should have concentrated on helping Korea to cope with temporary foreign exchange shortages and regaining access to international capital markets. And the rescue fund should have not been contingent upon the process of economic reform. This is not because the Korean economy was fundamentally healthy and structural reform was not necessary, but because an emergency measure for stabilization should have come first in order to prevent unnecessary complications of the crisis. That is, an emergency measure should have come first to achieve the short-run goal of financial stabilization, and then the fundamental measures should have come next to achieve the long-run goal of structural reform.
Secondly, as the conditions for financial aid, the IMF required Korea to undertake reforms that were not closely related to restoring market confidence and Korea's ability to repay its debt. To be more specific, a timetable for trade liberalization was required to be set to eliminate trade-related subsidies, restrictive import licensing, and the import diversification program. It is a question, however, how it would help Korea, which would need enormous current account surpluses to repay its foreign debts and recover from the crisis. As the IMF insisted, the trade liberalization would enhance domestic competition. But this was a measure, which would have been pursued at a later stage, because the corporations were already severely hit by high interest rates, credit crunches and a drastic downfall in demand for their products 3.3. Prognosis: Recovery?
As a consequence of the crisis and the improper response by the IMF and the Korean government, the Korean economy experienced a negative growth in 1998 for the first time since 1980. However, some signs of recovery have started to show recently. For example, the exchange rate has strengthened [ Figure 10 ], and interest rates have fallen to levels well below where they stood before the crisis erupted. [ Figure 8 ] At the end of 1998, short-term debt accounts for just 21percent of total debt and usable foreign exchange reserves surpassed US$50 billion. 25 The Korea Stock Price Index (KOSPI) has recently surpassed the 700-point level, up from the low of 298 points in June 1998. [ Figure 9 ]
Korea is now using a pump-priming policy with a focus on lowering market interest rates further in a bid to boost the economy. There are obviously signs that woes in small and medium enterprises have alleviated a bit with economic recovery and interest rate cuts. The ratio of dishonored bills, which rose to 2.1 percent in December 1997, has continuously declined to 0.2 percent in December 1998. [ Figure 11 ] Companies that defaulted on debt payments in Seoul hit 1,218 in December 1997, when Korea received a bailout from the IMF, and the figure rose to record high 1,226 in January 1998. But bankruptcies remained at 213 in January 1999, down 36.4 percent from December 1998.
The Korean government projects that in 1999 the economy will grow about 2 percent, with 3 percent inflation and a current account surplus of US$ 20 billion. In January 1999, Standard & Poor's and Fitch IBCA upgraded Korea's rating by one notch in recognition of the country's macroeconomic improvements and the progress of restructuring. In February 1999, another rating agency called Moody's Investors Service raised Korea's foreign currency country ceiling for long-term bonds and notes to the investment grade, Baa3, from a junk-bond grade, Ba1 and the foreign currency country ceiling for bank deposits to Ba2 from Caa1. The rating was upgraded more than a year after its rating was lowered on the heels of the financial crisis in 1997.
Thus, the possibility of a repetition of 1997's external liquidity crisis has been significantly reduced and the worst of Korea's financial crisis might have been over, but the situation needs cautioned. Over one and a half million people have lost their jobs. An ever growing number of people will lose their jobs in the near future. Restructuring will result in layoffs of 30 percent of Korea's government employees and bank workers. Many observers worry that unemployment problems are more serious than those featured in the official statistics. Labor unrest is likely to be the most serious problem in the process of structural reform.
There are many other obstacles to the recovery of the Korea economy. Korea needs to reduce government involvement in business decision-making processes and to create a legal and institutional framework of the market-driven economy that provides rational incentives for economic behavior. Korea needs to achieve a full paradigm shift on par with global standards, and this will take a rather long time. The process of corporate restructuring is still at an early stage. Successful and early completion of ongoing structural reform of enterprises and banks, and liquidation of non-performing loans will be the most important factor to ensure the nation recover fully from the current economic crisis. The problem is, however, how Korea can finance such a huge amount of expenses, required by the reform process.
On the other hand, there exits the possibility of the emergence of external shocks for the international environment could worsen at any time. There is a substantial risk that the world economy will plunge into recession in 1999 as the situation in Japan and other high-income countries are still expected to be highly volatile. Despite strong denials from the Chinese government, it becomes increasingly probable that China, with its corruption-riddled banking sector, might depreciate yuan in the foreseeable future. If China devalues yuan, it will renew currency instability in East Asia.
Another possible external shock could be the Millennium bug or Y2K problem. And an economic collapse of the North, which can not be ruled out, would place a heavy burden on the South. Although a full-scale attack by the North on the South seems a remote possibility, acts of desperation borne out of mass starvation can not be ruled out.
In other words, Korea was first taken to the emergency room to undergo an emergency operation. It seems now that the Korean economy has overcome the worst of the financial crisis and has left the emergency room for the intensive care room where it has to undergo another necessary operation (i.e., the structural reform). When this is done, Korea will enter the recovery room, where it will spend some time recovering from the woes of the operation before it will finally be discharged from the hospital, 'the IMF.'
Thus there are many internal and external obstacles to the full recovery of the Korean economy. If any of the obstacles is not adequately overcome, the crisis could turn out to be an even more enduring pain for the Korean people. On the other hand, if positive preconditions are met and the structural reform is smoothly accomplished, the crisis could turn out to be a blessing in disguise for the Korean economy.
Concluding Remarks
Drawing the analogy between the economy's financial system and the human circulatory system, this paper introduced a 'stroke' hypothesis of Korea's financial crisis. With the 'stroke' hypothesis, we were able to synthesize most of the appealing explanations and theories of the financial crisis and show how the numerous factors had been systematically intertwined in causing the financial crisis. In line with the 'stroke' hypothesis, we were also able to evaluate systematically the performance of the IMF's structural reform program.
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To conclude the paper, we briefly discuss two areas to which the stroke hypothesis can be applied. First of all, the 'stroke' hypothesis could be applied to the financial crises of other countries like Thailand, Indonesia, Brazil, etc. As in the case of Korea, this will allow us to analyze its causes and consequences more systematically and comprehensively. Nonetheless, unlike other approaches such as moral hazard or self-fulfilling models, the stroke framework can allow for significant country differences and explain unique features of each country. Secondly, it may be possible to use the stroke framework in devising an early warning system for the financial crises. Credit rating agencies such as Standard & Poor's, Moody's Investors Service, and Fitch IBCA seem to have devices for calculating the creditworthiness of different countries. As proven by the case of the Asian crisis, however, these rating agencies were not able to forecast the financial crisis beforehand. Instead, they have been criticized for aggravating the crisis, by at a later stage downgrading the ratings of the crisis countries. In academia, there have been few attempts to devise an early warning system. Jotzo (1999) recently attempted to devise an early warning system taking into account leading indicators suggested by the preceding literature. If we use the stroke framework, we could systematically and comprehensively identify the factors of four different causes of the financial crisis, and the long-run and immediate warning signs of the financial crisis. In addition, by marking risk indexes of the causing factors and warning signs, and summing them up, we could measure each country's likelihood of having a financial crisis.
There are still many questions and things that have to be tested, confirmed and answered. We conclude the paper with a statement by Paul Krugman.
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Anyone who claims to fully understand the economic disaster that has overtaken Asia proves, by that certainty, that he doesn't know what he is talking about.
